The core mandate of most Central Banks is clear: ENSURE PRICE STABILITY (A select few, like the Fed, also target maximum employment).

But their recent behaviour does raise this fundamental question: are they still solving the price stability problem? or have they conceded that fight?

This is fundamental because Central banks, the very institutions tasked with fighting inflation, are in a historic panic-driven gold rush.

Here is the data:

2022: 1,082 tonnes. That was the highest level since records began in 1950 and double the 2021 figure.

2023: 1,037 tonnes

2024: 1,045 tonnes. Marks the third consecutive year of a 1000+ purchase.

2025 (Projection): 600-700 tonnes, as de-dollarization and reserve diversification become entrenched policies.

The numbers show this is not a vague trend; it is driven by clear, repeat (but somewhat patchy) buying by Central Banks worldwide.

Why do I say, ‘somewhat patchy’?

Well, look at some of these buying patterns:

The PBOC paused its 18-month gold-buying streak in mid-2024, only to resume months later.

After a record 2022 purchase, Turkey briefly turned seller before launching a new, ongoing 27-month buying streak.

And then, there are some non-traditional buyers showing clear intent in 2025.

Which Central Bank has made the highest net purchase of Gold this year?

Russia?

No.

China?

No.

Surely Indonesia then?

No.

It’s Poland.

Next largest buyer?

China?

No.

It’s Kazakhstan.

The frenzied nature of the buying from the very fountainheads of monetary policy is unusual.

Central Banks are expected to combat inflation using interest rates and liquidity operations. Not by hoarding a ‘store of value’ themselves.

So, why the frenzied buying?

If it is to hedge themselves against the very inflation they are mandated to control, then it’s ironic!

Geopolitical concerns and the threat of confiscation of reserves are valid, but is that enough to justify this scale of buying?

1000+ tonnes? Year-after-Year?

This leads to two critical points:

1. What happens when Central Banks realize that their massive gold stockpiles generate zero cash flow? There is a massive opportunity cost there!

2. And if these are the leading moves to build a war chest to pay down ballooning public debt, then history offers a stark warning.

Look no further than the Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA) of the late 1990s. Coordinated selling to manage the price led to a 10+ year bear market.

Now, imagine the reverse: A coordinated gold sell-off (again!) by indebted nations could trigger an unprecedented price spiral.

Central Banks’ gold stockpiling ultimately reveals a lack of confidence in the fiat system they oversee.

In other words, Central Banks are preparing for a scenario that their own policies may have helped create.

Traditional Central Banking as we knew it appears well past its shelf life.

And that may not really be a bad thing.

By

Avinash Menon, CFA

Founder and CEO,

52 Seconds Capital Limited

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Now that we are past Jackson Hole, expect a sharp pickup in Fed-watching: from now until the next black out window (Sep 6-15).

Thanks to the prevalence of social media, there is no getting away from the barrage of FOMC-related newsfeeds.

This post isn’t about that.

It is about Authority Bias — our tendency to be influenced by people in positions of authority.

We must be wary of this.

To be clear, this post isn’t really about being dismissive of 5-year frameworks; it’s about not anchoring heavily into them.

Blunders have happened in the past and will continue to happen.

Here is an episode from the yesteryears to illustrate my point:

On Sept 26, 1999, a group of European central banks made a historic blunder.

They signed the first Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA).

The context?

Gold was languishing at $250/oz. The prevailing wisdom then was that gold was a ‘barbarous relic,’ an archaic asset that offered no yield.

Central banks, holding thousands of tonnes of it, were eager to sell gold for coupon generating govt bonds.

The problem?

Uncoordinated sales risked flooding the market and crashing the price further, hurting their own balance sheets.

The solution?

The CBGA.

Its ‘genius’ was to create a cartel of central banks not to prop up the price, but to manage its decline. They agreed to cap collective sales to 400 tonnes/yr for 5 years, providing ‘predictability’ to the market. In reality, it was a coordinated effort to offload an asset they believed was headed for obsolescence.

They succeeded in selling.

But the story didn’t end there.

The CBGA was renewed thrice (2004, 2009, 2014), continuing the managed sell-down. For over a decade, Western central banks were steady sellers.

They were selling into what became the greatest bull market in modern gold history.

The very act of capping sales reassured the market that a glut wasn’t coming. It provided a floor, and as other factors emerged — the rise of gold ETFs, and later, the GFC and the unprecedented QE — gold began its epic climb.

The irony is breathtaking.

The agreement designed to manage the orderly disposal of gold ultimately helped create the stability that allowed its price to soar.

Fast forward to the fourth and final agreement (2019). The tone had completely changed — gold remained an important reserve asset.

Why the change?

Because by 2019, the buyers were no longer private investors; they were the central banks of the East — Russia and China primarily — who saw gold’s strategic value as a USD-diversifier.

They were buying what the West was selling.

The CBGA signatories had executed the ultimate trading faux pas on a grand scale:

They sold low and, by ceasing their sales as the price rallied, ultimately bought high later.

The CBGA is a stark reminder that even Central Bank consensus is not always a signal of correctness; it could instead be peak groupthink.

So, keep your newsfeeds open.

And your anchors lightweight.

By

Avinash Menon, CFA

Founder and CEO,

52 Seconds Capital Limited

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